II.4

UNIVERSITY SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: A MATURE AND RESPONSIBLE DEFINITION

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SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY THEORY: VIRTUE, JUSTICE AND SUSTAINABILITY FOR 3D ETHICS

Social responsibility, a new core responsibility that complements moral and legal responsibilities, is a collective, not a personal, responsibility that fosters political creativity (Vallaeys, 2011). Whereas moral and legal responsibilities govern our acts, social responsibility governs our impacts; that is, the latter governs not what has immediate and local consequences, but what has to do with distant systemic and global emergencies. Once we understand that social responsibility is responsibility for impacts and that impacts are not the same as acts, we can explore the theoretical and practical richness of the social responsibility of organizations, in particular of universities.

The problems that require responsibility to be socialized refer to systemic issues arising from the social routines of a multitude of cohabiting people, with impacts that are often invisible unless supported by scientific research (for example, as seen with climate change). Since these routines, tied to a particular way of life, produce chronic, unwanted and socially damaging side effects, citizen co-responsibility becomes necessary for people, first, to recognize that their way of life generates endemic, unsustainable problems, and second, to institute the social changes necessary to solve these problems. The shift from unquestioningly experiencing social problems at the individual level to active co-responsibility regarding consensual solutions for common problems is what the philosopher Dewey (1984 [1927]) referred to as the constitution of a 'Public', that is, the emergence of a political collective capable of taking its destiny into its own hands, innovating and acquiring a proper, fair and sustainable political constitution, with adequate mechanisms for regulating collective action. Social responsibility is the quintessential political responsibility because it is relational – it is not the individual responsibility of elected representatives, but of all citizens united.

It is nowadays obvious that our collective problems are linked to the risk of our planet becoming ecologically uninhabitable due to industrial productivism and a lack of control over a modern social society – especially its economic, financial, scientific and technical systems – that is developing autonomously at a frantic pace. It is no longer possible to feel sure that these systems continue to be piloted in a socially responsible way by legitimate powers. The world's ecological problems are the outcome of a global political control problem. In early modernity, we had to figure out how to control the political domain and how to collectively resolve the problem of scarcity; therefore, we invented democracy and industrial technoscience. Today, our biggest problem is to take back democratic control over the powers unleashed by technoscience and handed over to the lucrative interests and 'blind intelligence' (Morin, 2004) of scientists, who, inadvertently, confirm Gabor's law: 'Everything that can be done will be done, whatever the consequences.' Reining in one's own power lest it becomes uncontrolled is the duty of the responsible individual. The political risk of before was that of an excess of political power; the political risk of today is that of a lack of political power, reflected in the impossibility of governing social powers unleashed by industrial modernity. Our era is the era of responsibility and reflexivity, of dominion over the domain (Serres, 1990), of the 'responsibility principle' (Jonas, 1979). Yet it is a strange and difficult responsibility to take on board: it is not the individual responsibility of a person or an organization, but a collective, mutualized, shared responsibility. It is, in short, a 'social', meta-subjective responsibility.

Distinguishing between the three core responsibilities – moral, legal and social – is therefore a fitting philosophical task that avoids confusion when analysing corporate social responsibility (CSR) and university social responsibility (USR); above all, it avoids mistaking these for the kinds of philanthropic act that result in greenwashing. The complex ethics that we need to take on board

is now simultaneously viewed in three distinct windows (Table II.4.1); in other words, our ethics are three-dimensional (3D) ethics (Morin, 2004; Vallaeys, 2011):

In this complex ethics, it is important to highlight three issues:

● No dimension can operate in isolation from other dimensions without ethical pathology developing as an outcome, whether this is moral fanaticism, legal dogmatism or ecological totalitarianism.

● Sustainability should not be reduced to ecology (the protection of nature) but should be understood in more complex terms as nourishing continued freedom and intergenerational justice, respect for the autonomy and dignity of upcoming generations, and respect for the ethical efforts of previous generations.

● Governance begins when government is no longer possible, that is, when stakeholders jointly regulate their collective actions and when no one stakeholder gives orders to (governs) any other stakeholder. A situation of government implies a hierarchical chain of obeyed orders and guaranteed sanctions in the event of disobedience (Luhmann, 1975). A situation of governance implies the need for mutual regulation regarding a common good (planetary habitability, global financial balance, international tax arrangements, overcoming social dumping, and so on) in the absence of a government coercing all stakeholders by law. Governance produces co-responsibility agreements according to rules whose implementation is mutually overseen by peers. Most of our current negative impacts call for us to build regulations via governance, since they involve transnational and meta-governmental coordination of multiple stakeholders for whom market self-regulation and national laws are insufficient (Ostrom, 1990). Liberal ideologues reject governance, because they believe that the market is perfectly capable of regulating collective action. Socialist ideologues also reject governance since it can never efficiently oblige social agents and so needs laws. Neither liberals nor socialists understand what is meant by social responsibility: the liberals view it as a form of corporate philanthropy (the moral responsibility of the good and virtuous manager or director), and the socialists reject it in favour of legal responsibility (obligations imposed by the State). In reality, socially responsible regulation requires, at the very least, both legislation and the market. Hybrid regulation involves peer associations and social innovations, over and above laissez-faire liberalism and legal coercion. Thinking in terms of real social responsibility removes us from the ongoing battle between liberals and socialists and also presents us with the challenge of establishing genuine co-responsibility for present and future generations of humans by simultaneously using all the possibilities for regulating collective action (Table II.4.2).

TABLE II.4.1 3D ethics (Vallaeys)			
3D ethics	1st dimension: personal ethics	2nd dimension: social ethics	3rd dimension: anthropological ethics
Type of obligation	Virtue	Justice	Sustainability
Subject	The individual (personal obligations)	Community (interpersonal obligations)	Humanity (transgenerational obligations)
Object	Acts	Laws	The world
Obligation framework	Personal conscience	The rule of law	International governance
Type of responsibility	Moral responsibility	Legal responsibility	Social responsibility
Generator of responsibility	One's own ills and the pain of others	Illegal acts and injustice	Negative impacts and systemic unsustainability
Regulation mode	Morality	Law	Politics

TABLE II.4.2 Four kinds of regulation of collective action: hybrid regulation (Vallaeys)			
Ethics	Non-programmed self-regulation: personal undertaking	I oblige myself	My law
Market	Non-programmed hetero-regulation: systemic feedback	Necessity obliges us	No law
Law	Programmed hetero-regulation: legal coercion	The law obliges us	Hard law
Partnership	Programmed self-regulation: mutual obligation	We oblige ourselves	Soft law

ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS: IS IT ENOUGH TO AVOID NEGATIVE IMPACTS?

Our philosophical reconstruction of a definition of social responsibility in terms of co-responsibility (for negative social and environmental impacts arising systemically from our collective lifestyle) is not an ad hoc invention but corresponds to an international consensus stated clearly in the ISO 26000 social responsibility standard (2010): an organization's social responsibility is its responsibility for impacts in its local and global social environment. Nonetheless, since impacts are not acts, nobody can assume this responsibility alone without linking up with other stakeholders. This inherently collective dimension of social responsibility is still not very well understood.

An ethical sensitivity for the traceability of links between individual acts and global impacts is, however, developing. The prioritization of environmental unsustainability and economic globalization injustices in the international public agenda is making us increasingly aware of the footprints left by our daily acts of purchase, transport, consumption, production, and so on. We are learning to develop ethical concerns for issues that are not necessarily directly visible to us. Is the way I shop sustaining an unfair system of exploiting workers without rights? Does my transport increase carbon emissions into the atmosphere? Does my work promote collusion between the sciences and the private interests of multinationals? By asking questions, we increasingly demand more socially responsible management from the companies, organizations and institutions with which we are associated.

A number of standards for good business practices have been developed in recent decades (ISO 14000, EMAS, SD 21000, AA 1000, SA 8000, SGE 21, GLOBAL GAP, GRI, Dow Jones Sustainability Index, ISO 26000, and so on). These standards define the best management practices for organizations to follow, according to their own core business and irrespective of the laws of their state. These standards are voluntary (since they are not laws), but the combined pressure of customers, investors, governments, professionals, managers, and so on makes them universal. They are often defined by experts, sometimes in multi-stake-holder round-table discussions and even in lengthy negotiations between public and private national and international social stakeholders, as was the case for ISO 26000 (Capron et al., 2011). These standards endeavour to acquire legitimacy in terms of ethical relevance (the definition of universally good actions)

and technical effectiveness (evaluable and successful quality management). They also endeavour to supplement, as 'soft law', the inevitable inadequacies of the 'hard law' of states, which are limited to legislating at the national level even though problems now occur globally. It nonetheless remains clear that soft law should complement or anticipate, not replace, hard law.

Universities are now entering this dynamic of regulated good practice and are beginning to formulate, as well as their own socially responsible initiatives, management tools intended to serve as a model and paradigm: STARS in the USA, LIFE in the UK, AISHE in Holland, PLAN VERT in France and Sustainability and Social Responsibility Reporting in Spain, not to mention the United Nations Academic Impact initiative (2010) and the Principles for Responsible Management Education applying to business schools. Latin America, since the early years of the new century, has also invested efforts in promoting USR, culminating in the publication of guidelines entitled *Responsabilidad Social Universitaria: Manual de Primeros Pasos* (Vallaeys et al., 2009).

Does this mean that all is well and that we can trust this voluntary movement of organizations abiding by increasingly socially responsible standards for a more just and sustainable world? In fact, if one examines these rules and the organizations that claim to practise them a little more deeply, it becomes apparent that they merely define 'best practices' for each organization to implement in isolation in 'their' management process with 'their' employees and 'their' stakeholders. Since this, no doubt, promotes more virtuous behaviour within organizations (good environmental practices, gender equity in leadership positions, better treatment of employees, participation in acts of solidarity with vulnerable populations, and so on), we can certainly speak of greater *moral responsibility* on the part of organizations concerned about CSR. Nonetheless, much remains before this moral responsibility is converted into the kind of *social responsibility* that will bring about changes in the entire social field – not just within organizations, but both between them and over and above them.

Current social responsibility standards do not encourage, over and above best practices, any movement towards inter- and transorganizational co-responsibility partnerships that would break with the current unjust and unsustainable system and result in social innovations capable of overcoming the chronic negative impacts of the 'global risk society' (Beck, 1986). For example, they encourage reductions in the carbon footprints of individual organiza-

tions but do not foster the implementation of new economic systems, such as the 'circular economy' or the 'economy of functionality', which require inter- and transorganizational management. The question remains: How can we expect to reduce our overall carbon footprint if we persist with an economic system that is fuelled by a focus on ever-growing sales and planned obsolescence?

The philosophical error of social responsibility standards is to confuse acts with their systemic impacts. Such confusion condemns to failure any attempt to address the root causes of systemic adverse impacts, because sustainability cannot be ensured merely by asking a few stakeholders to behave. On the contrary, good deeds can hide bad impacts (greenwashing) and bad impacts – like systemic impacts – need a reorganization of the system (political co-responsibility) and not just good initiatives within an unchanged system (ineffective philanthropy). Considering just the problem of USR: What use is it to adopt initiatives regarding a sustainable campus if the economic faculty continues to teach neoclassical economics that ignores environmental costs? What good is it implementing solidarity projects with indigenous populations if we continue to reject non-Western medicine in medical schools? What is the point of talking about socially responsible management at the university if we fail to address the underlying epistemic prejudices that have led modernity to its current state of unsustainable social and environmental development?

We can easily criticize CSR for being little more than discourse that barely changes the realities of the human exploitation of other humans and the chronic destruction of the habitability of our planet (AFL-CIO, 2013). But so too can we accuse USR of making superficial changes that barely reduce the 'blind intelligence' of academics and scientists, so expert in their tiny disciplinary niche that they fail to see the negative impacts they are generating in the transdisciplinary social fabric (Morin, 2004). As long as university USR evades transdisciplinarity, it will fail to suppress the main negative impact of university education. Yet fostering transdisciplinarity requires a reorganization of the entire education, research and knowledge management structure.

WHAT FORM SHOULD USR TAKE?

It is evident that we need a more rational and more coherent theory of USR than currently exists. We will remain close to the core definition of responsibility for

impacts, bearing in mind, moreover, that, since impacts are social, they cannot be managed alone. From there, we can suggest that *social responsibility should consist of a dynamic partnership for transforming a system that is reproducing the wrong impacts in which the university is participating*. The unifying thread in a definition of USR therefore reflects types of university impacts and the associated risks. The specificity of USR in relation to the social responsibility of other organizations (particularly corporations) depends on the specificity of university impacts, which in turn depend on what universities do, with whom they do this, who they affect and how they participate in the goal of all social responsibility, which is the local and global, social and environmental sustainability of society as a whole.

What is the university really doing? What and who are affected? What is its role in the current world crisis of human planetary unsustainability? Is it aggravating the crisis or does it, in fact, open up windows of opportunity? How does it reproduce or reduce social inequalities transmitted via each tranche of newly admitted students? How can the university be an agent of social change, weave new networks and help external social stakeholders to build new knowledge and new processes for equitable and sustainable development? If the university is functioning as a cloister, how can it project its learning beyond its walls? If the university is promoting knowledge and education that is entirely divorced from its social context, how can it become anchored in its territory? What attitudes does it promote in its academic and non-academic staff, what values does it foster, what processes does it encourage? Universities have to answer all these questions if they want to take social responsibility beyond the sententious and pompous speeches and meaningless social commitment statements that barely affect institutional routine. To help members of the academic community to respond to the questions listed above, it is necessary to identify the impacts and risks associated with the daily routines of the university and to consider how to promote reflection and initiatives in favour of positive impacts from the university community (managers, administrators, researchers, lecturers and students).

Following a dual organizational–academic axis, we can distinguish between four types of impact that are of relevance to the university (Figure II.4.1):
- internal organizational impacts affecting the university's community and the environment (organizational impacts);
- academic impacts related to educating people (educational impacts);

FIGURE II.4.1 Four kinds of university impact

- academic impacts related to building knowledge (cognitive impacts);
- external organizational impacts affecting society in general (social impacts).

ORGANIZATIONAL IMPACTS

Like any other employer, the university has an impact on the lives of its community, including its administrative staff, academics and students. The way in which it organizes its routine tasks also has environmental impacts, in the form of waste, deforestation, energy costs, transport costs, and so on. Organizational impacts affect both people and the environment, and the responsible university is concerned with its social and environmental footprint. What are the values that we live by from day to day on the campus? How can we live in the university in a responsible way, caring for nature and for the dignity and well-being of the university community?

EDUCATIONAL IMPACTS

The university provides education to young people and professionals and has a bearing on their ethics and values and their way of interpreting the world and behaving in it. It also has an impact on codes of ethics and, consciously or otherwise, guides the definition of the professional ethics and social roles of individual disciplines. Responsible universities ask what kind of professionals and citizens they are shaping and also reflect on the proper organization of education that ensures socially responsible students. What kind of professionals and people are we educating? How should we structure our educational system to build citizens who care for sustainable human development? Will our graduates be able and willing to redirect the currently unstable and unjust course of global development or will they simply want to find a job?

COGNITIVE IMPACTS

Universities guide the production of knowledge and have a bearing on the definition of what we socially call truth, science, rationality, legitimacy, utility, education, and so on. They incentivize (or not) the fragmentation and separation of knowledge by delimiting the scope of each specialism or course. They consolidate the relationship between technoscience and society, enabling (or not) social control and the appropriation of knowledge. They influence the definition and selection of problems to be placed on the scientific agenda. Responsible universities ask about the kind of knowledge they produce, its social relevance and its beneficiaries. What kind of knowledge are we producing, why and for whom? What kind of science do we foster – a democratic science or a science in the hands of the elite? What knowledge should we produce, and how can we disseminate it to meet the cognitive deficits that hinder sustainable development?

SOCIAL IMPACTS

The university is a social referent that may (or may not) foster progress, build social capital, prepare students for outside realities, provide access to knowledge, and so on. A university may close in on itself and act as an 'academic cloister' in imparting knowledge unrelated to its immediate context. It may want to just imitate what is done internationally and be unconcerned for its immediate surroundings. Alternatively, it may be anchored and deeply bound to its surroundings and wish to help solve its specific problems. The responsible university asks how it can contribute to societal development and to resolving its fundamental problems: What role can it play in the development of society, with whom and why? How can the university, given its function and specific expertise, participate in

social progress and promote education and knowledge for territorial social responsibility? With whom should universities associate to achieve territorial social responsibility?

Impacts, in general, imply risk: the risk of failing to comply with a mission, of being incongruent in declarations (for instance, regarding commitment to society and to excellence) and in actions, of failing to perceive the systematic reproduction and proliferation of social and environmental pathologies. Visualizing negative impacts is essential for an organization to be able to assume its social responsibility. Like any responsible person, a responsible organization is attentive to what it does, prevents potential adverse events, remains vigilant and takes precautions to avoid regret.

The statement that the university in itself and of itself is socially responsible given its educational and scientific goals is entirely misleading. Even well-meaning intentions to do good can produce negative impacts. Just as a law may be unjust, so too can education fail to educate and science fail to solve human problems. No organization is immune to the negative impacts that it generates in its social and environmental surroundings. If our universities educate the professionals and leaders of our currently socially and environmentally unsustainable world, then, given how they teach and generate knowledge, they are certainly co-responsible for the social pathologies they induce. Guilty, maybe not, but co-responsible, yes!

The negative impacts (Figure II.4.2) that threaten the relevance and congruence of the university function are, in fact, powerful prods to waken, warn and motivate us to do something creative, different and innovative to change daily life on campuses, in classrooms, in research laboratories and in our social interactions with external agents. They should serve as a compass, so that we do not become complacent, even when we can be proud to comply with good practices (which, happily, do exist in universities).

But the battle against negative impacts has to be managed rationally. Enabling the university to be vigilant with regard to incongruences and the risk of producing negative impacts are four basic processes that avoid, in turn, the four pitfalls of the irresponsible organization: corruption, autism, blindness and egocentrism. These processes are as follows:

● *Good university governance (or good government).* Defining and complying in a consistent manner with the organizational mission, implementing a code of ethics and creating an independent committee responsible for promoting and monitoring compliance, complying with the highest international labour, social and environmental standards as well as with national laws, ensuring a good workplace climate, combating discrimination and gender inequality, defending human rights, reporting results in a transparent and reliable way – these are just some recommendations promoted in USR management instruments, which aim essentially to combat *corruption* in the organization.

FIGURE II.4.2 **Possible negative impacts of universities**

● *Dialogue and accountability for stakeholders*. The stakeholder model views the university as an open space where interests and risks intersect for many individuals belonging (or not) and related (or not) to the university community, and affected (or not) by its performance and in turn having (or not) the power to affect performance. The university must properly respond to its stakeholders, establish a transparent and democratic relationship with them and reliably and honestly report the outcomes of joint decisions. It must listen to internal stakeholders (students, fixed-term and permanent lecturers, researchers and administrative staff) and external stakeholders (alumni, local communities, suppliers, the State, employers, non-governmental organizations [NGOs] and other universities). This process of socially responsible regulation through dialogue reduces the risk of *autism* in the organization.

● *Self-diagnosis of environmental and social impacts*. The social responsibility management philosophy invites universities to take stock of the possible consequences of their strategies and actions on persons, society and the environment. In promoting sustainable development, the university must become aware of its internal and external impacts on society and the environment, and must either resolve the problems diagnosed or mitigate them to a legally and socially acceptable level. Without adequate and ongoing self-diagnosis by the members of the university community itself, very little can be done to change established habits and foster improvements. Indeed, without measurement, improvement is difficult. Social responsibility thus becomes a management policy that forces the university to examine itself and to responsibly assume the risks of negative impacts. Self-diagnosis, because it is democratic and transparent, is also crucial as a way to practise good governance and to listen to, enter into a dialogue with and render accounts to community stakeholders. In this way, the risk of *blindness* in the organization is reduced.

● *Local social and environmental alliances for sustainable development*. Compliance with the university's mission and values, impact management and stakeholder participation combined lead from a reactive to a proactive logic in two areas: first, an involvement in solving social problems in the university environment; and, second, social anchorage and the creation of networks and alliances aimed at jointly tackling social problems. This partnership strategy for social responsibility – not only in the university as such, but also in the territory in which it operates – will be sustainable if external participation by the university yields returns in the form of better education, better campus management, better scientific innovation and the creation of more relevant knowledge. The constitution of alliances for local development does not mean one-off philanthropic gestures. USR, in overriding the arrogance of the deep-rooted belief that the university is the only source of knowledge, helps universities to build networks with other stakeholders (local authorities, NGOs, businesses, local communities, central government, international organizations, national and international universities, and so on) so as to achieve more ambitious social transformation goals. USR thus helps fight against the risk of *egocentrism* in the organization.

This last process tends to be overlooked, although it is, in fact, essential for a single, simple reason: no one can effectively control 'their' impacts on their own, whether eliminating them or mitigating them. As we have seen, as social agents we become 'entangled' in impacts that draw us into social networks shared with many other local, national and global stakeholders. It would be unrealistic to think that organizations operating in isolation could solve their unsustainable carbon footprint problem or the problem of the reproduction of poverty among those most marginalized by the current economic system. If social responsibility is responsibility for impacts on society and the environment (and this is the only precise definition of social responsibility that we have), any volition to deal with these impacts requires partnership with other stakeholders to try to redirect systemic processes that exceed the possibilities of an organization acting alone. Thus, organizational social responsibility, when properly understood, leads to a duty of partnership and of alliance-building for just and sustainable development. In other words, it leads to *territorial social responsibility* between partners located – depending on the extent of alliances and the problems to be resolved – in a specific local, regional, national, international or even global arena. It is pointless to consider social responsibility as an issue for an organization to deal with in isolation, as if it were the simple moral responsibility of performing good deeds and refusing to perform unlawful and unjust deeds. Responsibility is either social, that is, shared by all, or individual; and when it is individual, it is simply moral or legal responsibility.

The four types of impact defined above enable us to define four socially responsible management areas for the university (Figure II.4.3).

FIGURE II.4.3 **Four areas of social responsibility in universities**

USR FOR A UNIVERSITY ANCHORED IN ITS TERRITORY AND PROMOTING PUBLIC AND DEMOCRATIC KNOWLEDGE AGAINST THE MERCANTILIZATION OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE

In these times of financial liquefaction of the entire economy, everything is a good that can potentially be traded, and knowledge is no exception to this trend. Two ground-breaking innovations in higher education are currently presented as innocuous, although they may portend gloomy horizons for a university system that may eventually be controlled by transnational corporations: massive open online courses, and the triple helix (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 1997) that brings the public and private sectors and universities together in a economic innovation model that promotes 'corporate science'.

Online courses – as offered by Stanford and Harvard Universities, MIT, and so on (the Coursera, Udacity and edX websites) – are currently free and claim to transcend the walls of the faculty to ensure access to the best knowledge by all; however, they also unintentionally represent a knowledge model that is uprooted and unanchored and also, just like any purchasable commodity, capable of being produced and disseminated, irrespective of any associated history, location, language or social context. The teaching–learning process is thus optimized as a flow of uniform information made available to the greatest possible number of equally uniform students. The hidden curriculum behind this model is the denial of the personal and unique nature of the teaching–learning process as a *trans*formative and not just an *in*formative process. Valued knowledge is that which can be unanchored from territorial and intersubjective conditions of production and comprehension. On the horizon too is the disappearance of university diversity worldwide, and also the domination of English (already depleted as 'globish') and the rise of the monopolization of higher education by multinationals.

The triple-helix model, meanwhile, has the hidden – or maybe not so hidden – agenda of the privatization of knowledge through public and private demand for 'profitable' science. Markets undoubtedly have a role to play in promoting social welfare improvements and innovations. But the profitable exploitation of certain goods or services always requires that free public access be expressly prohibited to ensure sale and not free use. So once science becomes a commodity, it is no longer a common good or a transparent democratic activity open to the criticisms of peers (Apel, 1973; Habermas, 1981). The privatized commercial use of science, a direct contradiction of a production process that requires free examination and universal criticism, is only possible if we abandon the desire for true knowledge legitimized by an open community of scientists existing in an 'open society' (Popper, 1945) and if we instead practise a science that seeks to make or do, not a science that seeks knowledge. Naturally, scientists who seek knowledge, and especially the whistleblowers who warn about the dangers of scientific innovations, are systematically marginalized by the triple helix.

Against this commodification of education and science, USR is constructed as the model of a university anchored in its territory, open to dialogue, concerned about its local and global social and environmental impacts and active in promoting democratically produced science as a public and non-commodified good. USR encourages ongoing self-reflection by the academic community regarding epistemic horizons and the repercussions of its task. A 'green' university cares for its people and environment, aspires to worldwide academic diversity, rejects monopolies and the standardization of knowledge production, and encourages sustainable and equitable learning and research in communities of knowledge. There is no indication that its contribution to the universal cognitive and spiritual progress of humanity might be less than that of the model that holds science and knowledge to be commercial goods. It is time for universities to choose which model of society they aspire to. Here lies their moral responsibility regarding social responsibility.

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